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Introduction1
The Spanish 1978 Constitution created the State of Autonomies, a 
decentralized state based on the creation of 17 communities and two 
autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla) reflecting the cultural and linguistic 
plurality of Spain. This “imperfect federalism” (Moreno 1997) or “semi-
federalism” (Lijphart 1999: 189) is a de facto asymmetrical federal system 
in line with other multinational, multilingual federacies (i.e., Canada, 
Belgium, or India). Although asymmetries have been partly overcome over 
the years, there remain significant differences among two groups of 
communities –Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia (the “historic” regions) 
and Andalusia, and the rest. 
The political and economic relevance of autonomous communities has 
grown since their creation thanks to the transferring of powers and 
responsibilities from the central government. Between 1980 and 2000 the 
regions consolidated a bureaucratic structure that employed around one 
million civil servants and multiplied their budget by a factor of five (López et 
al. 2006: 15). Put another way: When the federalization process had just 
started in 1981, the total expenditure of the State was that of a centralized 
polity: The central government accounted for 87.3% of the expenditure, 
whereas regional governments for three per cent and municipalities for 
9.7%. More than twenty years later, in 2003, the distribution had changed 
and the central government’s share of total expenditure was 54%, regional 
governments 31% and municipalities 15%2. 
Federalization implied the emergence and consolidation of a regional 
political elite occupying the new institutions of representation and 
government. The creation of the State of Autonomies meant the opening of 
1,139 new seats in all 17 regional parliaments for each election. Taking into 
accounti differences in electoral cycles, the total number of regional seats 
opened to competition for the period 1980-2005 is 7,424. This number 
might seem small, but compare to the 3,906 seats for which politicians 
have competed for in national elections since 1979 for both Congress and 
Senate. In numerical terms, the regional political-institutional elite almost 
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doubles the national one. However, in terms of relevance and perceived 
importance there are still differences in favor of Members of Parliament 
(MPs) in Congress but not necessarily the Senate (Coller 2003b: 106). 
More attention should be paid to this regional political elite given that 
we know little about them and certainly they are increasingly important for 
their fellow citizens in federalizing countries. They are at the core of federal 
democratic systems (Best and Cotta’s (2000: 7). Regional politicians have 
an enormous impact on their respective societies –They have more power, 
control a larger budget, set the political agenda in their regions, have 
become a nursery for national politicians, are usually closer to citizens than 
national representatives, regulate increasingly more areas that affect 
citizen’s lives, and, yet, we barely know who they are or what they do in 
their parliaments (Patzelt 2002: 96). It is certainly surprising that after 25 
years of regional politics there is no study that focuses on the social profile 
of politicians or on their activities in parliaments.  
The research in which this paper is based is focused on political elites 
holding a seat in regional parliaments during the period 1980-2005. This 
regional elite is composed of 4,354 individuals and their presence in 
regional institutions is the result of the policies of parties and their 
selectorates, who decide who should be in the electoral list and in what 
position, and consequently contribute to the final social outlook of 
parliaments after elections3. As with any political elite, regional politicians 
share many social features but also present some differences4. If we had to 
summarize the social features of the regional elite we would say the group 
is mainly composed of young men born in the region they serve, highly 
educated, mostly lawyers and educators, and with relevant social 
differences due to party and territory.  
More women 
Men have largely dominated regional politics between 1980 and 2005 
to the point that women barely pass the 20% threshold in terms of 
participation in the political elite, as can be seen in Table 1. Over 25 years 
of federal democratic politics, the parliaments most open to women have 
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been those of Castile-La Mancha, Madrid, Cantabria, Andalusia, Valencia, 
and Baleares, while those where women’s participation is minimal have 
been those of Murcia, Canary Islands, Aragon, and Catalonia.  
 
Table 1 
Proportion of women in each legislature 
 Total  
 1980-2005 I II III IV V VI VII 
 % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N 
Andalusia 24 410 5 109 7 109 13 109 24 109 30 109 36 109 38 109 
Aragon 18 243 6 66 1 67 7 67 12 67 28 67 33 67 -- -- 
Asturias 23 154 9 45 13 45 22 45 18 45 33 45 31 45 -- -- 
Canary Isl. 16 220 2 60 2 60 7 60 10 60 28 60 35 60 -- -- 
Cantabria 25 138 9 35 8 39 3 39 15 39 38 39 44 39 -- -- 
Castilla-Leon 20 308 4 84 4 84 8 84 20 84 28 83 35 82 -- -- 
C-La Mancha 28 197 2 44 8 47 19 47 21 47 38 47 49 47 -- -- 
Catalonia 17 520 6 135 9 135 11 135 13 135 13 135 24 135 30 135 
C. Valenciana 24 311 6 89 6 89 13 89 29 89 40 89 42 89 -- -- 
Extremadura 20 216 5 65 3 65 14 65 17 65 26 65 32 65 -- -- 
Galicia 18 302 4 71 1 71 9 75 11 75 21 75 33 75 33 75 
Balearic Isl. 24 200 6 54 12 59 19 59 27 59 30 59 36 59 -- -- 
La Rioja 22 128 11 35 12 33 22 33 21 33 30 33 40 33 -- -- 
Madrid 26 357 13 94 17 96 21 101 26 103 32 102 40 111 -- -- 
Murcia 15 178 5 43 0 45 11 45 18 45 18 45 26 46 -- -- 
Navarra 20 198 4 50 8 50 12 50 24 50 22 50 32 50 -- -- 
Basque Count. 23 274 7 60 11 75 12 75 21 75 25 75 29 75 33 75 
TOTAL 21 4,354 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Source: Our own based on official sources 
Note: 1. Totals in each autonomous community for the period (N) does not equal 
the total number of seats because there are MPs who have been elected more than 
once. 2. Percentages rounded. 3. Because of different electoral cycles, legislatures 
in Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country do not coincide with the 
rest of regions. For instance, legislature III in the Basque Country begins in 1986, 
two years earlier than in Catalonia, four years earlier than in Andalusia, and five 
years earlier than in the rest of regions 
 
Although politics have been mainly managed by men, and mirroring 
changes in society, women tend to access regional parliaments 
increasingly over the years, even earlier than in the Congress of Deputies 
of Spain and other European parliaments5. For instance, according to data 
in Table 1, at the beginning of the 1980’s, the proportion of women in 
regional parliaments barely reached 10% while by the beginning of the 
twenty-first century (sixth legislature) the proportion in most parliaments 
was over 30% and in some cases (like Castile-La Mancha) almost reached 
50%. There is a case (Murcia in 1987) where no woman was present in the 
regional assembly. In twenty five years of regional politics, a growing 
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women’s participation into politics brings chambers to a more balanced 
representation. 
Regional parliaments can be grouped in four types according to the 
timing and strength of the incorporation of women. There are the pioneers, 
those in which women participate earlier and proportionally more (almost 
double) than in any other region –Asturias, Castile-La Mancha, 
Extremadura, Rioja, and the Basque Country. There are the laggards, 
those parliaments where women participate proportionally less and tend to 
be incorporated later than in other chambers. These are the cases of 
Murcia and, surprisingly, Catalonia. There are also the slow starters that 
catch up at the end of the period studied (like Galicia and Cantabria, but 
especially Valencia), and the champions, those which begin early and keep 
a steady growth of women’s participation –Madrid and La Rioja.  
This variety poses the following question: why are some political elites 
more reluctant than others to incorporate women to the electoral lists and 
thus to parliaments? There are reasons to explain the incorporation of 
women in politics6, but there are not so obvious reasons to explain regional 
differences. Valiente et al. (2003) found that leftist parties incorporate more 
women and earlier than conservative ones, the difference being statistically 
relevant. Still, our findings suggest that in some regions, the ideological 
cleavage plays a secondary role. To demonstrate it, we offer an analysis of 
two opposed cases, a champion (Madrid) and a quite counterintuitive 
laggard (Catalonia), and we will add a third case (Basque Country) to find 
an explanation to the puzzle of Catalonia. 
Madrid is a unique case in that it is a pioneer and the proportional 
participation of women shows a steady, high growth rate throughout the 
period. This evolution is common to conservative and leftist parties, as can 
be seen in Table 2. The evolution of the presence of women in the regional 
chamber is quite similar with two differences. With minor variations, PSOE 
and PP show similar proportions of women until the fourth legislature 
(1995), when the socialists’ increment in the presence of women is higher 
than the populares’, although the latter catch up in the sixth legislature. IU 
begins incorporating more women earlier and keeps a high level, although 
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the presence of women suffers a minor set back in the fourth legislature. It 
seems that in the case of Madrid, all three parties have made a similar 
effort to incorporate women onto the electoral list in winning positions and, 
consequently, have contributed to make this community both a “pioneer” 
and a “champion”. 
 
Table 2 
Proportion of women in each legislature in Madrid, Catalonia, and Basque 
Country 
 Total  
 1980-2005 I II III IV V VI VII 
 % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N 
Madrid                 
PP 27 160 12 34 19 32 21 47 24 54 29 55 44 57 -- -- 
PSOE 27 134 14 51 17 40 21 34 31 32 36 39 38 45 -- -- 
IU 27 48 11 9 14 7 31 13 23 17 37 8 33 9 -- -- 
Catalonia                 
CiU 14 182 7 43 8 72 10 69 13 70 13 60 14 56 19 46 
ERC 14 50 0 14 0 5 0 6 0 11 0 13 8 12 30 23 
PSC 23 138 6 33 12 41 14 42 15 40 18 34 33 52 38 42 
IC 24 49 12 25 17 6 11 9 29 7 18 11 33 3 44 9 
PP 17 47 0 0 0 11 17 6 14 7 12 17 42 12 27 15 
Basque C.                 
PNV-EA 27 110 12 25 16 32 17 30 22 31 30 30 30 27 50 22 
HB 17 46 9 11 9 11 8 13 15 13 27 11 29 14 14 7 
PSE 23 52 0 9 5 19 10 19 19 16 25 12 28 14 46 13 
IU 18 11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 6 0 2 33 3 
PP 20 35 0 2 14 7 0 2 0 6 18 11 31 16 46 13 
Source: Our own based on official sources 
Notes: 1. Percentages rounded. 2. We have selected the largest parties present in 
most of the legislatures and neglected short lived parties. 3. In the Basque Country, 
we have collapsed PNV and EA since EA appeared in the second legislature 
(1984), created by PNV affiliates that abandoned the party. EA and PNV made an 
alliance for the seventh legislature (2001). 4. Total refers to the number of 
individuals holding a seat. Some MPs have been present in more than one 
legislature 
 
Contrary to Madrid, Catalonia is a counterintuitive case. This is a 
region highly developed in economic and cultural terms and a high 
presence of women in the political elite can be expected to be the reflection 
of this development. However, contrary to the expectation, Catalonia 
becomes a “laggard” in terms of women’s incorporation into politics, as can 
be seen in Table 1. The reason is to be found in the different behavior 
towards women that parties have had over 25 years of regional politics. 
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Contrary to Madrid and other regions, the divide in Catalonia is not found in 
the ideological cleavage, but in the nationalistic one.  
Considering the whole period, the proportion of women present in 
Convergencia i Unió (CiU) is the same as in Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya (ERC), as can be seen in Table 2. Both nationalist parties, 
however, show a different evolution. By the early eighties, the presence of 
women was minimal in both groups. ERC blocked women’s presence until 
the sixth legislature (1999) when a single woman obtained a seat in the 
regional parliament. The turning point was 2003 (seventh legislature), when 
ERC incorporated almost a third of women into its parliamentary group 
following an earlier change in the leadership that impinged a mildly leftist 
outlook to the party. Contrary, there is no turning point for CiU, but a steady 
and slow evolution that brings the proportion of women from 7% to 19% in 
the seventh legislature. In any case, CiU has never placed more than ten 
women in its large parliamentary group. 
A different picture emerges when we examine the behavior of the 
nominally non-nationalist parties concerning the presence of women in their 
parliamentary groups. According to data in Table 2, the socialist PSC and 
the former communist IC have similar proportions of women during the 
period considered (almost a fourth), and even the conservative PP has 
proportionally more women than the nationalist groups. The evolution of 
these three parties is similar. The PP has consistently had a lower 
proportion of women than the leftist parties until the sixth legislature (1999), 
when the five women elected made almost half of this group. A few years 
later and after a change in the leadership, the presence of women was 
reduced to a fourth in the seventh legislature. Leftist parties have 
proportionally incorporated more women than the populares, although they 
have also experienced a turning point in the sixth legislature, when a third 
of each parliamentary group was women. Then, in the seventh legislature 
the proportion grew within IC to 44% and to 38% among the socialists. 
It seems that Catalonia being a laggard in regional politics is due more 
to the low presence of women in nationalist parties vis a vis non-nationalist 
ones. Is there anything among nationalist parties that prevent them from 
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incorporating women into their electoral lists or is it just a matter of the 
Catalan nationalist parties? A comparison between Catalonia and the 
Basque Country could help to answer the question. Both regions are 
economically advanced and women’s participation in public life is usually a 
reflection of this development. Both regions, as well, have large, powerful, 
influential, and ruling conservative nationalist parties. However, their 
political behavior concerning women differs quite remarkably. Data in Table 
2 indicates that the largest nationalist party in the Basque Country (PNV-
EA) also has the largest proportion of women in its parliamentary group. To 
the contrary, the self-proclaimed leftist nationalist HB-EH (whose name has 
changed several times for legal problems related to its association with the 
terrorist group ETA), has the lowest proportion of women in its ranks at the 
regional chamber. In the middle we find the non-nationalist parties PSOE, 
PP, and IU (called there Ezkerda Batua). It is difficult to talk about a 
nationalist or even an ideological divide in the case of gender in the Basque 
Country. The evolution of the participation of women in parliamentary 
politics also shows relevant differences. In Catalonia, leftist parties and 
lately the PP, led the incorporation of women into the regional chamber. In 
the Basque Country, it seems that the largest nationalist parties have led 
this transformation.  
Therefore, Catalonia being a counterintuitive case is largely the result 
of the policies of nationalist parties which do not place women in winning 
positions in the electoral list. Given the electoral system in Spain, the 
research question should focus the attention on to what is called the 
selectorates, those members of a party who decide the internal 
composition of the electoral list. Surprisingly (and regretfully), our empirical 
knowledge about these bodies is quite low.  
Young politicians growing old 
The age distribution of the political elite is an important component of 
their social background; age profile can be an indicator not only of human 
capital, but it also can show the openness of the political structure to 
newcomers. Following Inglehart (1990), young MPs can incorporate a good 
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deal of new values and priorities to the legislative process and the political 
debate that may seem alien to veteran politicians from older generations. 
However, young politicians may be more inexperienced, lack social ties 
with their rivals, be less pragmatic and consequently less inclined to 
consensus or to reach pacts with their political rivals (Coller 2002). 
Regional parliaments are not the arena for gerontocrats. The average 
regional politician in Spain is 43.3 years old at the time of his/her first 
entrance, which sides these politicians with the age distribution of MPs of 
most Western European democracies, which are on the 40-49 age range, 
and certainly below the average age of MPs in the Congress of Deputies 
(Linz et al. 2000: 441). Although Blondel (1973: 77), indicated that “it is 
natural that legislators should be older than the ‘average’ citizen of a 
country”, the fact is that in the case of Spain the average regional politician 
is younger than the average citizen of voting age, which was 44.5 in 1981 
and 46.6 in 2001, according to census data collected by INE (1985, 2001). 
This is largely a young elite at the point of entry, but this is a quite common 
pattern in the similarly young Spanish democracy. Consider Adolfo Suárez 
(43), Felipe González (40), José María Aznar (43), and José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero (43), presidents of government that were not older 
than 43 when they took office. 
The youth of regional politicians reflects the democratic pathways to 
the regional parliaments. Before the consolidation of democracy, the 
average age of politicians was 52 (Equipo Data 1969) and the average age 
of ministers during Francoism and the transition was 51 (Lewis 1972, Linz 
et al. 2003: 87). However, during the democratic period, both ministers and 
congresspersons were younger (average age around 44). These findings 
suggest that vis a vis authoritarian regimes, democratic institutions 
incorporate younger people to the political process and this has a reflection 
in the average age of politicians in regional parliaments. 
The pattern of age distribution shows some slight difference across the 
regions. In general, younger politicians can be found in the first legislatures 
(average age of 41), although the average age has grown over the years. 
Many young politicians (especially in the socialist party) began their careers 
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in the regional arena. Some remained there and others went to national 
politics. Also, young politicians are found when the majority in parliament 
changes. That means the party obtaining the largest plurality of seats has 
placed in the electoral list a number of politicians younger on average than 
their predecessors. While the older politicians, on average, come from 
Castile-Leon, Cantabria, the Basque Country, Galicia, and Catalonia, the 
younger politicians are found in Andalusia, Asturias, Murcia, La Rioja, and 
Extremadura7. The small but significant age gap between the regional MPs 
belonging to the PSOE and to the PP (see Table 6) could explain such age 
profile differences among the regions. For example, the autonomous 
communities with the youngest politicians were often governed by the 
PSOE while the communities with the oldest politicians are strongholds of 
the PP. The exceptions are the Basque Country and Catalonia, mainly 
ruled by conservative nationalist parties enjoying large majorities of seats. 
Also, the regions holding the first regional elections (the Basque Country, 
Catalonia, Galicia, and Andalusia) have on average more veteran MPs 
(43.7 years old) than the rest of the autonomous communities (40.8 years 
old), which might be due to the fact that, except in Andalusia, conservative 
parties obtained the largest plurality of seats. Thus, it might be the case 
that conservative parties tend to place older politicians in the electoral list 
than leftist parties, who may recruit future MPs from younger segments of 
the population. 
Fewer internal migrants 
The regional politician has been born in the region s/he serves in 84% 
of the cases, which, overall, has left little room for internal migrants to 
participate in the political elite of their host regions8. Furthermore, over the 
years, internal migrant’s presence in regional chambers has diminished 
substantially, except in the case of Aragon (see Table 3). The scarcity of 
internal migrant participation in the political elite should not be surprising in 
some regions that have traditionally exported labor force to other areas 
within Spain. For instance, many inhabitants of Andalusia, Extremadura, 
Castile-Leon, Castile-La Mancha, and Galicia have traditionally nurtured 
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the industries and services of other regions (and Europe) and have 
attracted proportionally fewer individuals to live there. As a result, these 
regions, together with the Canary Islands, show the lowest proportion of 
internal migrants both in 1981 and 2001 according to data of the official 
census (INE 1985, 2001). To the contrary, Catalonia, Madrid, Basque 
Country, Balearic Islands, and Valencia have been a pole of attraction for 
Spaniards migrating to work from other regions. As a result, these regions 
have the largest (but decreasing) proportions of internal migrants in Spain 
both in 1981 and 2001. 
 
Table 3 
Proportion of internal migrants in each legislature 
 Total  
 1980-2005 I II III IV V VI VII 
 % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N 
Andalusia 4 402 5 105 4 106 4 109 4 107 1 107 1 109 8 109 
Aragon 18 239 15 65 18 66 20 66 12 66 19 67 18 67 -- -- 
Asturias 12 68 17 12 13 15 11 27 11 45 4 27 4 27 -- -- 
Canary Isl. 7 201 5 60 5 56 5 60 9 58 2 48 7 55 -- -- 
Cantabria 17 137 23 35 18 38 18 38 18 38 10 39 10 39 -- -- 
Castilla-Leon 11 286 9 84 12 84 8 84 9 73 15 73 10 77 -- -- 
C-La Mancha 27 192 30 43 30 47 23 47 30 43 19 47 17 47 -- -- 
Catalonia 11 489 14 135 8 135 9 135 7 135 7 135 7 133 10 104 
C. Valenciana 18 302 20 86 18 89 19 89 17 82 14 88 16 89 -- -- 
Extremadura 10 185 19 43 16 64 10 62 7 60 11 64 6 65 -- -- 
Galicia 7 284 1 68 3 69 11 72 11 74 9 70 3 68 4 75 
Balearic Isl. 19 199 15 54 21 58 22 59 24 59 20 59 19 59 -- -- 
La Rioja 23 128 29 35 21 33 21 33 9 33 15 33 18 33 -- -- 
Madrid 43 334 50 91 40 95 41 95 35 64.9 36 99 38 105 -- -- 
Murcia 17 91 25 16 18 39 20 25 6 18 17 23 13 45 -- -- 
Navarra 16 197 12 50 16 50 12 50 16 50 12 49 16 50 -- -- 
Basque Count. 17 24 12 8 18 11 20 10 0 6 33 6 33 6 40 5 
TOTAL 16 3,758 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Source: Our own based on official sources 
Note: Totals in each autonomous community for the period (N) does not equal the 
total number of seats because there are MPs who have been elected more than 
once. Percentages rounded 
 
It is expected that the presence of internal migrants in regional 
parliaments will reflect the these trends of migration. This is the case in 
most of the aforementioned regions. For example, Andalusia, Galicia, 
Extremadura, and Castile-Leon, “exporters” of labor force, reflect also low 
levels of internal migrants in their regional parliaments, as can be seen in 
Table 3. The political elite of the Canary Islands being in this group also 
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reflects the low rate of migrants going from the peninsula to the islands to 
work. The deviant case here is Castile-La Mancha, whose political elite 
seems to be more open to internal migrants than others.  
Among the regions with the largest share of internal migrants, the 
expectations are met in most of the cases. For example, Madrid appears as 
one the regions whose parliament has been more open to internal migrants 
reflecting the high proportion of non-natives living in the region. To a lesser 
extent, the Basque Country (an unreliable case because of the lack of 
information), Balearic Islands, and Valencia show high levels of internal 
migrants in their regional parliaments as is reflective of their status as 
recipients of internal migrants. The counter case here is Catalonia for being 
in the group of parliaments with low levels of non-natives while having a 
large share of internal migrants in the population.  
Contrary to the cases of other developed regions, why there are so 
few non-native politicians in Catalonia if the population there has a large 
share of internal migrants? Similarly, why Castile-La Mancha has a larger 
proportion of non-native politicians than could be expected from their share 
of the population?  
 
Table 4 
Proportion of internal migrants in each legislature in Catalonia and Castile-La 
Mancha 
 Total  
 1980-2005 I II III IV V VI VII 
 % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N 
Catalonia                 
 CiU 5 195 0 43 1.4 72 3 69 4 70 7 60 7 54 9 28 
 ERC 0 48 0 14 0 5 0 6 0 11 0 13 0 12 0 21 
 PSC 20 137 33 33 22 41 14 42 12 40 6 34 10 52 19 41 
 IC 17 48 20 25 17 6 11 9 14 7 9 11 33 3 0 8 
 PP 10 38 0 -- 0 11 33 6 0 7 12 17 0 12 0 6 
Castile-LM                 
 PSOE 22 111 23 22 24 25 26 27 30 23 27 26 14 29 -- -- 
 PP 33 76 38 21 39 18 21 19 32 19 9 21 22 18 -- -- 
Source: Our own based on official sources 
Notes: 1. Percentages rounded. 2. We have selected the largest parties present in 
most of the legislatures and neglected short lived parties. 3. The total is not the sum 
of the Ns of the 7 legislatures since there have been some repetitions. The total is 
the number of MPs for whom we have information 
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According to census data, in 1981 there were 10% of internal migrants 
in Castile-La Mancha while in 2001 the proportion was 14%. It can be 
expected, thus, a similar proportion in the elite. However, data in Table 3 
and Table 4 show that the political elite of this region has been consistently 
more open to non-natives than their fellow politicians from other 
autonomous communities. This is a region where internal migrants are 
overrepresented in the political elite. Certainly, the two major parties 
contribute to this situation in a similar way. PP supplies a larger share of 
internal migrants than the PSOE for the whole period, although over the 
years non-natives in the PP reduce their presence more strongly than in 
the PSOE. This reduction is similar across Spain. Why the selectorates of 
both parties have consistently placed a larger proportion of internal 
migrants in the electoral list over the years? Perhaps, for the political elite, 
place of birth is not relevant although our guess is that it might become 
more and more important insofar decentralization advances associated to 
the emergence and consolidation of regional identities. 
Contrary, Catalonia has been a pole of attraction for many Spaniards 
since the nineteenth century. As a consequence, more than a third of the 
Catalan population in 1981 and a fourth in 2001 was born elsewhere in 
Spain. However, their share in the political elite for the period considered is 
only a tenth (11%) and over the years the presence of internal migrants in 
the regional chamber has been reduced at a faster and deeper rate than in 
the population. This evolution does not have a reflection in the composition 
of the political elite. To the contrary, Catalonia appears as one of the 
communities where the disparity between elite and social structure is 
among the largest. This makes Catalonia a counterintuitive case. The 
reason is to be found in the nationalist policies followed by all parties. 
As data in Table 4 indicate, only the so-called non-nationalist parties 
(socialists and former communist IC in the left, and populares, in the 
center-right) present some relevant proportion of internal migrants in the 
political elite for the period under study. However, the difference between 
right and left is marked: non-nationalist leftist parties seem to be more open 
to society in what geographical origins is concerned by a margin of almost 
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2 to 1. Nationalist parties, nevertheless, are the least open to society and 
those who contribute the least to the presence of internal migrants in the 
regional chamber. The extreme case is ERC, whose parliamentary groups 
during the period have been composed of “Catalan natives only” while 
moderately conservative CiU has contributed with 5% of its MPs to the 
“diversity” of the regional chamber.  
There are opposing trends. Over the years, CiU has incorporated 
more non-natives up to the 9% level reached during the seventh 
legislature. The PP seems to have an erratic path that could be due to 
changes in leadership and, consequently, changes in the composition of 
the electoral list. However, as data in Table 4 shows, leftist parties have 
steadily been closing the doors of the Catalan Parliament to non-natives, 
increasing thus the distance between society and parliamentary groups. IC 
goes from 20% in the early 1980s to 0% in 2003 with a pick of 33% (that is, 
one single MP) in the sixth legislature. This group has gone through a 
number of crises of identity whose outcome has been a more Catalanist 
approach to politics.  
But the most dramatic closure to non-natives is the one experienced 
by the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC). Table 4 shows that the composition of 
its parliamentary group went from a third of internal migrants in 1980, 
mirroring the situation in society, to a steady diminishment of non-natives 
until the fifth legislature (6%), far from the Catalan society and especially 
the traditional socialist electorate composed largely of non-native workers. 
This showed that the Catalan socialists have increasingly placed natives in 
the electoral list showing a movement of the PSC towards a more 
nationalist outlook that has been very well studied by Miley (2006). A 
number of changes, including the rising of local leaders of immigrant origins 
to the leadership of the party, affected also the internal composition of the 
electoral list provoking a growth in the proportion of internal migrants in the 
sixth and seventh legislatures. It remains to be seen whether these 
changes will consolidate the opening of the electoral lists to wider 
segments of society.  
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University trained MPs, educators and lawyers 
Regional politicians are well educated with 85% holding a university 
degree. Around a tenth (11%) finished their studies at high school and 3% 
finished only primary school or have no education. Few hold a PhD degree 
(8%), while the vast majority (60%) has a licenciatura. The remaining 17% 
obtained a university degree after three years of education. This group of 
regional politicians is more educated than local councilors in Spain, and 
certainly, university training is as common for them as it is for national 
representatives and even proportionally more common than for European 
parliamentarians9. It seems that Keller (1963: 121) was right indicating that 
“education is the single most important entrance requirement into the 
higher circles”. It should not surprise, then, that the most common 
professions in the regional parliaments are those that require university 
degrees –educators and liberal professions, especially lawyers. 
Blondel (1973: 81) indicated that there were three models of 
parliaments according to the predominance of the professions. The 
“lawyers’ paradise” was characteristic of the industrialized world. 
Parliaments in the communist countries were dominated by workers, 
peasants, and the intelligentsia, while parliaments in developing countries 
saw the emergence of civil servants, teachers, and managers as the 
dominant professional groups. Spanish regional parliaments are a 
combination of the first and third model with clear tendencies aligned with 
the normal development of modern parliaments –The opening of seats to a 
variety of professional groups. 
The profession of politicians for the period considered is in line with 
what is expected. Liberal professions are the largest group and, among 
them, law related professionals are the most common (19%). Although 
relevant professional groups, physicians (6%), architects (1%), engineers 
(4%) or economists (4%) are not as frequent among politicians as those 
professions related to the legal system. The largest group is that of 
educators (21%), with workers (11%), and managers and owners (13%) 
receiving a good share of power. Civil servants (excluding professors) 
comprise a 4% of the elite. This elite is distinctively different from the one 
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composed of municipal politicians in which the largest professional groups 
are farmers (34%) and industrial workers (18%) (Botella 1992: 155). It is 
also slightly different from politicians of the Congress of Deputies, whose 
proportion of educators and civil servants tend to be higher and that of 
managers and entrepreneurs, and workers lower (Linz et al. 2000: 442). 
 
Table 5 
Law Related Professionals and Educators (1980-2005) 
 Law related professionals Educators 
 % N % N 
Andalusia 16 328 36 328 
Aragon 8 233 15 233 
Asturias 16 64 28 64 
Canary Isl. 26 197 23 197 
Cantabria 11 120 20 120 
Castilla y Leon 14 279 23 279 
C-La Mancha 21 186 26 186 
Catalonia 17 441 18 441 
C. Valenciana 18 258 26 258 
Extremadura 15 179 23 179 
Galicia 29 227 21 227 
Balearic Isl. 19 16 12 16 
La Rioja 13 126 15 126 
Madrid 27 306 14 306 
Murcia 8 89 28 89 
Navarra 19 189 14 189 
Basque Count. 39 103 15 103 
TOTAL 19 3,341 21 3,341 
Source: Our own based on official sources 
Note: Totals in each autonomous community for the period (N) does not equal the 
total number of seats because there are MPs who have been elected more than 
once. Percentages rounded 
 
Lawyers seem to be the cradle for many representative and executive 
jobs in politics, as a number of studies have demonstrated10. In the regional 
political elite, lawyers get a good share of power as well (a fifth of the total, 
as can be seen in Table 5). The Basque Country, Galicia, Madrid and the 
Canary Islands are those regions whose parliaments have a larger 
proportion of law related professionals in the whole period considered11. To 
the contrary, Aragon, Murcia and Cantabria are those whose regional 
assemblies have a lower proportion of lawyers and related professions.  
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For most autonomous communities, the proportion of lawyers in the 
first legislature is slightly higher than in the second. The first legislature is 
crucial since regional institutions are built and developed. Law related 
professionals have a say in this process (perhaps they are the most 
qualified ones) and this might be the reason that their presence in the first 
legislature is higher. However, in the second legislature the institutional 
building is complete and largely developed, making the role of the lawyer 
more dispensable in Parliaments. Generally speaking, contrary to what has 
happened historically in the majority of chambers (Best and Cotta 2000, 
Uriarte 2000: 118, Jerez 1997), our data suggest a growing presence of 
law related professionals in regional parliaments, although there are 
differences among regions. 
The presence of lawyers is still quite high compared to other 
professions. This occurs in most countries. Why are there consistently so 
many lawyers in the political elite? There are three explanations –elective 
affinity, dispensability, and professional benefits. Already Weber (1946: 94) 
had pointed out that there is an elective affinity between lawyers and 
politicians emphasizing that since the French Revolution, lawyers and 
democracy go together, initiating a common and spread trend (Eulau and 
Sprague 1964). This should not be much of a surprise. Usually lawyers are 
familiar with the legislative process (making laws, debating, arguing, 
negotiating) so they bring some sort of know-how to parliaments.  
Unlike other professionals, lawyers are quite dispensable, and 
dispensability is crucial to understand modern politics (Weber 1946: 85). 
Lawyers are more dispensable than other groups like doctors, journalists, 
or workers largely because their professional practice can be easily taken 
over by some partner that keeps the business running while in parliament. 
Furthermore, contrary to the experiences of other liberal professionals 
returning to their professional practice after serving in parliament, the 
lawyer may benefit from contacts and specialized knowledge acquired 
during his political career. It is not only less costly but it can even be 
beneficial for lawyers to return to their profession after some years of 
service in parliament or the executive. 
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No matter how important the group of law related professionals in the 
political elite, it is outnumbered by that of educators –21% are university 
professors or teachers. The growing presence of educators in parliaments 
over time has already been emphasized in other studies. In the case of the 
regions of Spain, the relative weight of this group has increased like that of 
lawyers, going from 19% in the first legislature (early eighties in all cases) 
to 23% in the sixth legislature (early 2000s in all cases). Data in Table 5 
indicates that Andalusia is the region with the highest proportion of 
educators followed by Murcia, Asturias and Valencia. To the contrary, 
Balearic Islands, Madrid, Navarre, Rioja and Aragon are the regions whose 
parliaments have the lowest proportions of educators12. Those regions 
where leftist parties have enjoyed large majorities of seats show as well a 
large proportion of educators. This is consistent with the fact that for the 
whole period considered, the presence of educators in the socialist party 
almost doubles (28%) that of the PP (16%), as will be seen shortly. 
Why are there so many educators in the political elite? Uriarte (1997: 
269), following Norris and Lovenduski (1995), suggests that educators, like 
lawyers and journalists, are part of the “talking professions” who master the 
use of words both in speeches and in writing. These skills are relevant for 
parliamentary duties: debate, argue, convince, negotiate, and write laws. 
However, if Norris and Lovenduski are fully right, how can we explain the 
relevant absence of journalists in the regional elite? Although the 
“mastering of words” is an important explanation for the presence of 
educators, it can be complemented with another factor. In our opinion, the 
important proportion of educators in the political elite can also be 
accounted for their dispensability. A large majority of educators in Spain 
are civil servants and as such, they have some privileges in terms of 
tenureship. Unlike other professionals, their jobs are secure. Consequently, 
they can easily begin a career in politics and come back to the university or 
the school if the political career fails or is interrupted. The costs they may 
face when they come back to the school or the university are low in 
comparison with that of, say, workers or architects. The relatively secure 
professional future helps professors (and also civil servants) to participate 
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in the political elite, but more often in leftist parties than in conservative 
ones, as will be seen shortly. 
Party differences 
Does it make any difference for the social profile of the political elite 
the party to which the politician belongs? Let us not forget that political 
elites follow the “law of increasing disproportion” (Putnam 1976: 33) and 
the “rule of distance” (Sartori et al. 1963: 317), meaning that people from 
more underprivileged backgrounds usually have to “travel” a longer social 
distance to be part of the elite and thus tend to be underrepresented after a 
self-selective process. However, the type of party makes a difference. 
According to Putnam (1976: 37), “the degree to which an elite diverges 
from the independence model of statistically perfect representation is 
closely related to its ideological orientation. The more conservative a party 
or regime, the greater the overrepresentation of upper-status social groups 
within its leadership”. Certainly in the case of the regional political elite, it 
seems that the social profile of MPs varies with party membership, showing 
that there are traditional of recruitment that are barely shared. 
Rather than focusing on the 30 parties present in the 17 chambers 
between 1980 and 2005, we will focus our analysis on the two national 
parties with representatives in all regional parliaments: the socialist party 
(PSOE) and the popular party (PP, center to right). Both are the major 
contenders in national and most regional elections gathering 70% of the 
4,354 regional MPs. 
As can be seen in Table 6, the socialist party has been traditionally 
more open to women than the conservative party. The PP incorporated 
women to the electoral lists much later than the PSOE, whose leaders 
followed a policy of affirmative action for women reserving quotas in the 
electoral list. Later, some socialist regional leaders introduced the “zipper 
list” consisting on alternating men and women in the electoral list. These 
measures promoted a larger presence of socialist women in regional 
parliaments. Soon, the conservative party followed and began placing 
women in the electoral list, but without a formal policy of affirmative action. 
 20 
  
 
Table 6 
Party differences in the regional political elite in Spain, 1980-2005 (in %) 
 PSOE PP Total elite  
Women 25 21 21 
Age 43.1 45.6 44 
Immigrants 17 16 16 
University graduates 52 67 85 
Average education 3.52 3.66 3.57 
Lawyers 13 25 19 
Educators 28 16 21 
Workers 18 5 11 
Owners 4 12  
   13 
Managers 2 6  
Source: Our own based on official sources 
 
The average conservative MP is slightly older than the socialist one 
across all legislatures. The difference is stronger in the earliest legislatures 
when a generation of young politicians in the PSOE controlled a large part 
of regional parliaments. For instance, in the early eighties, the average 
socialist MP was 38.4 years old while the average conservative politician 
was 45.4 years old. However, twenty years later, by the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, both socialist and conservative MPs are 45 years old 
on average. In the case of the PP, a group of young politicians led first by 
Antonio Hernández Mancha and more successfully later by José María 
Aznar, took power in the party by the early 1990s initiating a generational 
renovation, accounting for the reduction in the age gap. Conversely, 
because of their early majorities in regional chambers socialists MPs tend 
to stay longer in parliaments (Coller 2002), contributing to the aging 
process of MPs. 
Both parties are equally open to immigrants, although the major 
differences are related to education and professions, as can be seen in 
Table 6. As it happens in other countries (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 
101), conservative MPs are more educated than leftist ones showing also a 
higher proportion of university training. This might have a consequence on 
the quality of the legislative work of the regional parliaments, an issue that 
should deserve more attention by researchers of the quality of democracy.  
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The only element that is common in both parties is the liberal 
professionals (architects, engineers, doctors, economists, etc.), a large 
group whose presence in the regional political elite seems to be 
independent of party. The exception seems to be the law related 
professions: The conservative party doubles the proportion of lawyers in 
the socialist party, showing a clear difference in the sources of recruitment. 
Conversely, the socialist side is professionally dominated by educators. 
The difference with the conservative field is significant and might be 
explained by the fact that educators are usually civil servants and 
consequently have more chances of initiating a political career. Usually, 
leftist parties nurture a good portion of their ranks in parliaments with 
dispensable professionals employed by the State more often that 
conservative parties, whose politicians’ dispensability usually stems from 
their professional status as liberal professionals, owners, managers, and 
entrepreneurs. 
A final major difference concerning professional groups is related to 
the traditional sources of recruitment of politicians for leftist and 
conservative parties. Data in Table 6 shows that the socialist party tends to 
recruit regional politicians from workers more often that the conservative 
party. Conversely, the conservative party tends to recruit from owners and 
managers for a good deal of their politicians and certainly more often than 
the socialists. According to the odds ratio, it is 10.8 times more likely that 
the conservative party places an owner or manager in parliament than the 
socialist party. The odds of a worker entering parliament through the PP 
are 0.09. Thus, considering the four major professional groups, workers 
and educators tend to be present in the socialist party more often than in 
the PP, a party whose sources of recruitment are more associated to the 
legal system and to owners, managers and entrepreneurs. 
Conclusions  
This research provides a longitudinal assessment of the background of 
the regional political elites while shedding light into the pattern of elite 
recruitment and embeddedness with society. The overall research findings 
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are uncontroversial: Being a young man born in the region, well educated 
and working as educator or in the legal system is the most frequent avenue 
to become part of the regional political elite in Spain. Despite these general 
trends, over the years, women have seen a rise in their chances of entering 
the regional political elite, while it has gotten harder for internal migrants. 
As Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (2006) detect for the US case, despite a 
somewhat growing diversity, there are some common features among 
regional politicians.  
There are relevant differences, though. Comparing regions, we found 
that political elites in Catalonia follow a quite unexpected behavior 
concerning recruitment of women and non-natives which is rooted in the 
nationalist ideology. Contrary, but also unexpectedly, Castile-La Mancha’s 
selectorates seem more open to women and internal migrants than 
Catalonia. We think we have showed the relevance of the ideological and 
nationalist divide in some communities. Furthermore, party also makes a 
difference in some respects. Apart from the presence of liberal 
professionals in both major parties, the traditional sources of recruitment 
become almost exclusive and are only minimally shared. For workers and 
educators is easier to enter the elite through the socialist party while for 
managers, owners and entrepreneurs, and certainly lawyers, it is easier to 
become politicians through the conservative side. However, the 
professional variety of the elite is quite high, pointing towards the 
professionalization of the political elites, which is a process that may reflect 
the engagement of politicians on area-specific issues and activities (Best 
and Edinger, 2005: 501). 
Contrary to the heterogeneity of the population, social similarities in 
the political elite are the outcome of the recruitment of politicians privileging 
some social features and discriminating against others. Thus, women, 
internal migrants, lesser educated, very young and very old people seem to 
be more absent from the elite than other social groups, which makes the 
elite’s social profile a highly similar one with some tendency towards 
diversity in some respects, which is also the outcome of the different 
contribution of parties. 
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Notes 
1. This research was made possible by the funds provided by the Spanish 
Minister of Education and Culture, project BSO2003-02596, and the of 
Georgetown University. Thanks are also due to the audiences of several at 
Georgetown University, Universidad de Alicante, International Political Science 
Association (Fukuoka), Université de Montpellier, University of Pennsylvania, 
Kelloggs International Institute at Notre Dame University, Institut de Ciències 
Polítiques i Socials, and the Center for European Studies at Harvard 
University. Robert Fishman, Roberto Garvía, and Josep A. Rodríguez gave 
useful advice and Juan J. Linz made insightful suggestions. For comments, 
write to the first author: xavier.coller@aya.yale.edu. For a larger and different 
version of the research findings, see http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/ 
publications/ces_papers.html.  
2. For the transition to democracy and the federalization process, see Maravall 
and Santamaría (1986), Linz (1989), Linz and Stepan (1996), and Powell 
(2001). For the process of transferring powers to the regions and the building 
of the Estado de las Autonomías, see Linz (1989), Subirats and Gallego 
(2002), and Agranoff and Ramos (1998). See Merry del Val (2005) and 
Toboso (2005) for the evolution of the economic resources transferred to the 
regions. For the growth of the regional bureaucracy, see Ramió and Salvador 
(2002). 
3. All the information on which this paper is built comes from official sources 
obtained from regional parliaments, Senate or Congress of Deputies. The 
information we have gathered is unequal. We have 100% of information for the 
gender variable, 86% for age and place of birth, 72% for education, and 77% 
for profession. We have omitted from our analysis parties that were shortlived, 
although their MPs were counted for the total. 
4. See, for instance, Norris (1999), Best and Cotta (2000), Norris and Lovenduski 
(1995), Putnam (1976), Aberback et al. (1981) Valiente et al. (2003), Martínez 
(2000), Genieys (2004), Uriarte (1997), Coller (2003a).  
5. See Uriarte and Ruiz (1999), Valiente et al. (2003), and the study of European 
parliaments carried out by Mateo Díaz (2005). There were 6% of women in the 
Congress of Deputies in 1977 and 28% in the eighth legislature (2000-04) 
(Valiente et al. 2003: 185). In 1986, 8% of the Spanish representatives in the 
European Parliament were women while in 1999 there were already 34% 
(Martínez 2000: 271). 
6. See Uriarte and Ruiz (1999: 212), Valiente et al. (2003: 197-203), Mateo Díaz 
(2005: 224), and (Verge 2006). 
7. Lack of information for the Basque Country, Asturias, and Murcia renders the 
average age unreliable. 
8. Internal migrants refer here to those individuals that have been born in Spain 
but not in the region where they live. 
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9. See Linz et al. (2003: 92), Norris (1999: 97), Capo (1992: 140), Martínez 
(2000), Valiente et al. (2003: 191), Uriarte and Ruiz (1999: 215). 
10. See Norris and Lovenduski (1995), Norris (1999:93), Martínez (2000: 274), 
Del Campo et al. (1982: 143), Uriarte (2000: 118), Jerez (1997), Linz et al 
(2000), Cuenca and Miranda (1987: 139), Lewis (1972), Linz et al. (2003: 97). 
For an overall historic appraisal of the profession of politicians, see Best and 
Cotta (2000). 
11. Missing information in the Basque Country renders this proportion unreliable. 
12. Missing information in the Balearic Islands and Murcia for some legislatures 
renders this proportion unreliable. 
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